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Abstract
One-clock priced timed games is a class of two-player, zero-sum, continuous-time games that was
defined and thoroughly studied in previous works. We show that one-clock priced timed games can be
solved in time m12nnO(1), where n is the number of states and m is the number of actions. The best
previously known time bound for solving one-clock priced timed games was 2O(n
2+m), due to Rutkowski.
For our improvement, we introduce and study a new algorithm for solving one-clock priced timed games,
based on the sweep-line technique from computational geometry and the strategy iteration paradigm
from the algorithmic theory of Markov decision processes. As a corollary, we also improve the analysis of
previous algorithms due to Bouyer, Cassez, Fleury, and Larsen; and Alur, Bernadsky, and Madhusudan.
1 Introduction
Priced timed automata and priced timed games are classes of one-player and two-player zero-sum real-time
games played on finite graphs that were defined and thoroughly studied in previous works [2, 4, 3, 17, 1, 7, 9,
6, 8, 12, 15]. Synthesizing (near-)optimal strategies for priced timed games has many practical applications
in embedded systems design; we refer to the cited papers for references.
Informal description of priced timed games. Informally (for formal definitions, see the sections below),
a priced timed game is played by two players on a finite directed labeled multi-graph. The vertices of the
graph are called states, with some states belonging to Player 1 (or the Minimizer) and the other states
belonging to Player 2 (or the Maximizer). We shall denote by n the total number of states of the game
under consideration and m the total number of arcs (actions). Player 1 is trying to play the game to
termination as cheaply as possible, while Player 2 is trying to make Player 1 pay as dearly as possible for
playing. At any point in time, some particular state is the current state. The player controlling the state
decides when to leave the current state and which arc to follow when doing so. For each arc, there is an
associated cost. Each state has an associated rate of expense per time unit associated with waiting in the
state. The above setup is further refined by the introduction of a finite number of clocks that can informally
be thought of as “stop watches”. In particular, some arcs may have associated a reset event for a clock. If
the corresponding transition is taken, that clock is reset to 0. Also, an arc may have an associated clock
and time interval. When the arm of the clock is in the interval, the corresponding transition can be taken;
otherwise it can not. With three or more clocks, the problem of solving priced timed games is known not to
be computable [6]. In this paper, we focus on the computable case of solving one-clock priced timed games.
We shall refer to these as PTGs. We shall furthermore single out an important, particularly clean, special
case of PTGs. We shall refer to this class as simple priced timed games, SPTGs. In an SPTG, time runs
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from 0 to 1, the single clock is never reset, and there are no restrictions on when transitions may be taken.
A slightly more general class of games was called “[0,1]-PTGs without resets” by Bouyer et al. [8].
Values and strategies. As is the case in general for two-player zero-sum games, informally, a priced timed
game is said to have a value v if Player 1 and Player 2 are both able to guarantee (or approximate arbitrarily
well) a total cost of v when the game is played. The guarantees are obtained when players commit to (near-
)optimal strategies when playing the game. Player 1, who is trying to minimize cost, may (approximately)
guarantee the value from above, while Player 2, who is trying to maximize cost, may (approximately)
guarantee the value from below. Clearly, in general, the value of a one-clock priced timed game will be a
function v(q, t) of the initial state q and the initial setting t of the single clock. Bouyer et al. [8] showed that
the value v(q, t) exists1 and that for any state q, the value function t→ v(q, t) is a piecewise linear function
of t. By solving a game, we mean computing an explicit description of all these functions (i.e., lists of their
line segments). From such an object, near-optimal strategies can be synthesized.
Example. Figure 1 shows an SPTG with n = 5 states. Circles are controlled by Player 1 and squares are
controlled by Player 2. States and actions have been annotated with rates and costs. If no cost is given for
an action it has cost zero. The figure also includes graphs of the value functions. Actions are shown in black
and gray, and an optimal strategy profile is shown along the x-axis of the value functions by using these
colors – more precisely, it is the optimal strategy found by our algorithm. Waiting is shown as white.
If both players follow the indicated optimal strategies, then the play that starts with state 3 as the current
state at time 0, is as follows:
1. At state 3 at time 0, Player 1 waits until time 13 and then changes the current state to state 2.
2. At state 2 at time 13 , Player 2 waits until time
2
3 and then changes the current state to state 4.
3. At state 4 at time 23 , Player 1 does not wait, but immediately changes the current state to state 3.
4. At state 3 at time 23 , Player 1 waits until time 1 and then changes the current state to state 1.
5. At state 1 at time 1, Player 2 can not wait, and immediately changes the current state to state ⊥, a
special state indicating that play has terminated.
Notice that the play waits in state 3 twice. This may seem like a counter-intuitive property of a play
where the players play optimally. In fact, the game can be generalized to a family, such that the game with
n states has a state that is visited O(n) times in some optimal play.
1.1 Contributions
The contributions of this paper are the following.
1. A polynomial time Turing-reduction from the problem of solving general PTGs to the problem of solving
SPTGs. The best previous result along these lines was a Turing-reduction from the general case to the
case of “[0,1]-PTGs without resets” by Bouyer et al. [8]. Our reduction is a polynomial time reduction
reducing solving a general PTG to solving at most (n+1)(2m+1) SPTGs, while the previous reduction
is an exponential time reduction.
2. A novel algorithm for solving SPTGs, based on very different techniques than previously used to solve
PTGs. In particular, our algorithm is based on applications of a technique from computational geom-
etry: the sweep-line technique of Shamos and Hoey [16], applied to the linear arrangement resulting
when the graphs of all value functions are superimposed in a certain way. Also, an extension of Di-
jkstra’s algorithm due to Khachiyan et al. [13] is a component of the algorithm. We believe that
an implementation of this algorithm and the reduction could provide an attractive alternative to the
1Players in general cannot guarantee the value exactly, but only approximate it arbitrarily well – one of the particular
appealing aspects of SPTGs is that they do have exactly optimal strategies! This is in contrast to both the general case and
[0,1]-PTGs without resets.
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Figure 1: Example of an SPTG, showing value functions and an optimal strategy profile.
current state-of-the-art tools for solving PTGs or various special cases (e.g., such as those of UPPAAL,
http://uppaal.org or HyTech http://embedded.eecs.berkeley.edu/research/hytech/), which
all seem to be based on a value-iteration based algorithm independently devised by Bouyer, Cassez,
Fleury, and Larsen [7]; and Alur, Bernadsky, and Madhusudan [1]. We shall refer to that algorithm as
the BCFL-ABM algorithm.
3. A worst case analysis of our algorithm as well as an improved worst case analysis of the BCFL-
ABM algorithm. Interestingly, the analysis of the algorithms is quite indirect: We analyze a different
algorithm for a subproblem (priced games, see section 2), namely the strategy iteration algorithm, also
used to solve Markov decision processes and various other classes of two-player zero-sum games played
on graphs, and relate the analysis of this algorithm to our algorithm. To summarize the result of the
analysis, it is convenient to introduce the parameter L = L(G) of an SPTG to be the total number of
distinct time coordinates of left endpoints of the linear segments of all value functions of G. Note that
the parameter L is very natural, as L is a lower bound on the size of the explicit description of these
value functions, i.e., the output of the algorithms under consideration. We show:
(a) For an SPTG G, we have that L(G) ≤ min{12n,
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+1)}, where S is the set of states and
Ak the set of actions in state k. The best previous bound on L(G) was 2
O(n2), due to Rutkowski
[15].
(b) The worst case time complexity of our new algorithm is O((m + n logn)L). In particular, the
algorithm combined with the reduction solves general PTGs in timem12nnO(1). The best previous
worst case bound for any algorithm solving PTGs was 2O(n
2+m), due to Rutkowski [15], who gave
this bound for an alternative algorithm, due to him.
(c) The worst case number of iterations of the BCFL-ABM algorithm is min{12n,
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+1)}m ·
nO(1) for general PTGs, significantly improving an analysis of Rutkowsi. (An ”iteration” is a
natural unit of time, specific to the algorithm – each iteration may take considerable time, as
entire graphs of value functions are manipulated during an iteration).
(d) For the special case of PTGs with all rates being 1 (i.e., all states are equally expensive to wait
in) and all transition costs being 0 (i.e., Player 1 wants to minimize the time used), our algorithm
combined with the reduction runs in time O(nm(min(m,n2) + n logn)). This special case is also
known as timed reachability games, and it was studied by Jurdzinski and Trivedi [12] who gave
an exponential algorithm. Trivedi [18] also observed that the region abstraction algorithm of
3
Laroussinie, Markey, and Schnoebelen [14] can be used to solve the problem in polynomial time.
Our algorithm and reduction provides an alternative proof of this result.
(e) For one-clock priced timed automata (the special case of priced timed games, where all states
belong to Player 1), our algorithm combined with the reduction runs in time O(mn3(min(m,n2)+
n logn)). This seems to be the best worst case bound known for solving these. It was previously
shown to be in NLOGSPACE by Laroussinie, Markey, and Schnoebelen [14].
The above bounds hold if we assume a unit-cost Real RAM model of computation, which is a natural model
of computation for the algorithms considered (that previous analyses also seem to have implicitly assumed).
The algorithms can also be analyzed in Boolean models of computation (such as the log cost integer RAM), as
a rational valued input yields a rational valued output. Bounding the bit length of the numbers computed by
straightforward inductive techniques, we find that this no more than squares the above worst case complexity
bounds. The somewhat tedious analysis establishing this is not included in this version of the paper.
1.2 History of problem and related research
Priced timed automata (or weighted timed automata) were first introduced by Alur, Torre, and Pappas [3]
and Behrmann et al. [4]. They showed that priced timed automata (viewed as one-player games) can be
solved in exponential time. Even before the introduction of priced timed automata, a special case was
studied by Alur and Dill [2]. They show this case to be PSPACE-hard even for automata where all states
have rate 1 and all actions cost 0. Bouyer, Brihaye, Bruyere, and Raskin [5] showed that the problem of
solving priced timed automata is in PSPACE. I.e., the problem is PSPACE-complete when there is no limit
on the number of clocks. Solving one-clock priced timed automata was shown to be in NLOGSPACE by
Laroussinie, Markey, and Schnoebelen [14].
Bouyer, Cassez, Fleury, and Larsen [7] and Alur, Bernadsky, and Madhusudan [1] independently intro-
duced the notion of priced timed games and also both considered value iteration algorithms for solving priced
timed games. Even with only 3 clocks, the existence of optimal strategies becomes undecidable for priced
timed games, as shown by Bouyer, Brihaye and Markey [6]. They improved a similar result of Brihaye,
Bruyere, and Raskin [9] for 5 clocks. Hence, various special cases have been studied. For timed reachability
games, Jurdzinski and Trivedi [12] showed that the problem of computing optimal values is in EXP, and
that the problem is EXP-complete for 2 or more clocks.
For the case with only one clock the problem becomes computable, as shown by Brihaye, Bruyre, and
Raskin [9]. Bouyer, Larsen, Markey, and Rasmussen [8] gave an explicit triple exponential time bound on
the complexity of solving this problem. This was further improved to 2O(n
2+m) by Rutkowski [15].
1.3 Organization of paper
Our algorithm is most naturally presented in three stages, adding more complications to the model at each
stage. First, in section 2, we show how the strategy iteration paradigm can be used to solve priced games,
where the temporal aspects of the games are not present. In section 3, we show how the algorithm extends
to simple priced timed games. Finally, in section 4, we show how solving the general case of one-clock
priced-timed games can be reduced to the case of simple priced timed games in polynomial time.
In terms of the list of contributions above, contribution 1) is Lemma 4.8. The algorithm of contribution 2)
is SolveSPTG of Figure 5. Contribution 3a) is Theorem 3.11, contribution 3b) is Theorem 3.12, contribution
3c) is Theorem 4.10, contribution 3d) is Theorem 4.11 and contribution 3e) is Theorem 4.12.
2 Priced games
In this section, we introduce priced games. To accommodate lexicographic utilities which will be necessary
for subsequent sections, we shall consider priced games with utilities in domains other than R. In this
section, we fix any ordered Abelian group (ℜ,+,−, 0,≤) for the set of possible utilities. We let ℜ≥0 be
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the set of non-negative elements in ℜ. In subsequent sections, we will either have ℜ = R or ℜ = R × R
with lexicographic order. In the latter case, we write (x, y) as x + yǫ, where we informally think of ǫ as an
infinitesimal. In addition to utilities in the group ℜ, we also allow the utility∞ (modeling non-termination).
Formal definition of priced games. A priced game G is given by a finite set of states S = [n] = {1, . . . , n},
a finite set of actions A = [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. The set S is partitioned into S1 and S2, with Si being the set
of states belonging to Player i. Player 1 is also referred to as the minimizer and Player 2 is referred to as
the maximizer. The set A is partitioned into (Ak)k∈S , with Ak being the set of actions available in state k.
Furthermore, define Ai =
⋃
k∈Si
Ak. Each action j ∈ A has an associated non-negative cost cj ∈ ℜ≥0 ∪ {∞}
and an associated destination d(j) ∈ S ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is a special terminal state. Note that G can be
interpreted as a directed weighted graph. In fact, a priced game can be viewed as a single source shortest
path problem from the point of view of Player 1, with the exception that an adversary, Player 2, controls
some of the decisions.
Positional strategies. A positional strategy for Player i is a map σi of Si to A, with σi(k) ∈ Ak for each
k ∈ Si. A pair of strategies (or strategy profile) σ = (σ1, σ2) defines a maximal path Pk0,σ = (k0, k1, . . . ),
from each k0 ∈ S ∪ {⊥}, possibly ending at ⊥, such that d(σ(ki)) = ki+1 for all i ≥ 0. Note that σ can be
naturally interpreted as a map from S to A. Let ℓ(k, σ) be the length of Pk,σ. The path Pk,σ recursively
defines a payoff u(k, σ) ∈ ℜ ∪ {∞}, paid by Player 1 to Player 2, as follows:
u(k, σ) =


∞ if ℓ(k, σ) =∞
0 if k =⊥
cσ(k) + u(d(σ(k)), σ) otherwise
I.e., the payoff is the total cost of the path Pk,σ from k to the terminal state ⊥, or ∞ if Pk,σ does not reach
⊥.
Values and optimal strategies. The lower value v(k) of a state k is defined by v(k) = maxσ2 minσ1 u(k, σ1, σ2).
A strategy σ2 is called optimal, if for all states k, we have σ2 ∈ argmaxσ2 minσ1 u(k, σ1, σ2). Similarly, the
upper value v(k) of a state k is defined by v(k) = minσ1 maxσ2 u(k, σ1, σ2) and a strategy σ1 is called optimal
if for all k, σ1 ∈ argminσ1 maxσ2 u(k, σ1, σ2). Khachiyan et al. [13] observed that v(k) = v(k), i.e., that priced
games have values v(k) := v(k) = v(k). They also showed how to find these values and optimal strategies
efficiently using a variant of Dijkstra’s algorithm. The strategies found were postional, hence implying that
optimal positional strategies always exists. The ExtendedDijkstra algorithm is shown in Figure 3,
with v being the vector of values. Viewing a priced game as a single source shortest path problem, it is not
surprising that it can be solved by a Dijkstra-like algorithm. Intuitively, if an arc to be taken by Player 2
would be optimal for Player 1, Player 2 will, if possible, do anything else and, informally, “delete” the arc.
Example. Figure 2 shows an example of a priced game. The round vertices are controlled by Player 1, the
minimizer, and the square vertices are controlled by Player 2, the maximizer. Bold arrows indicate actions
used by a strategy profile σ, and dashed arrows indicate unused actions. Actions are labeled by their cost,
except if the cost is zero. Finally, the states have been annotated by the values. Note that σ is an optimal
strategy profile.
Nash equilibrium. We say that σ1 is a best response to σ2 if σ1 ∈ argminσ1 u(k, σ1, σ2), for all k ∈ S.
Note that σ1 is optimal for the game where Player 2 is restricted to play according to σ2. Similarly, σ2 is
a best response to σ1 if σ2 ∈ argmaxσ2 u(k, σ1, σ2), for all k ∈ S. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is a Nash
equilibrium if σ1 is a best response to σ2, and σ2 is a best response to σ1. The following is a standard lemma
that establishes the connection between Nash equilibria and values of zero-sum games.
Lemma 2.1 If σ = (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium, then v(k) = u(k, σ) for all k ∈ S.
Proof: Assume that either σ1 or σ2 is not optimal. We will show that (σ1, σ2) is not a Nash equilibrium
for play starting in some state of the game. Assume, without loss of generality, that σ1 does not guarantee
Player 1 the payoff v(k) for play starting at k. There are two cases.
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⊥
u(1, σ) = 0
u(2, σ) = 3 u(4, σ) = 3
u(5, σ) = 5
u(3, σ) = 3
c(5,⊥) = 5
c(3,1) = 3
Figure 2: Example of a priced game and a strategy profile σ.
Function ExtendedDijkstra(G)
(v(⊥), v(1), . . . , v(n))← (0,∞, . . . ,∞);
while S 6= ∅ do
(k, j)← argmin
k∈S,j∈Ak
cj + v(d(j));
if k ∈ S1 or |Ak| = 1 then
v(k)← cj + v(d(j));
σ(k)← j;
S ← S \ {k};
else
Ak ← Ak \ {j};
return (v, σ);
Figure 3: The ExtendedDijkstra algorithm of Khachiyan et al. [13] for solving priced games.
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• Case 1: u(k, σ1, σ2) ≤ v(k). In this case, Player 2 can deviate from σ2 to play a best response to σ1 at
state k. Since σ1 does, by assumption, not guarantee Player 1 v(k), this will yield a larger payoff than
v(k), i.e., the deviation improves payoff for Player 2 and (σ1, σ2) is therefore not a Nash equilibrium
for play starting at k.
• Case 2: u(k, σ1, σ2) > v(k). In this case, Player 1 can deviate to play an optimal strategy σ∗1 . By
definition of optimal, this improves his payoff to v(k) and (σ1, σ2) is therefore not a Nash equilibrium
for play starting at k.

Strategy iteration algorithm. We shall present a different algorithm for solving priced games, following
the general strategy iteration pattern [11]. This algorithm will be extended to priced timed games in the
next sections. The algorithm presented in the next section can also use the variant of Dijkstra previously
described, but our analysis of the running time will use this strategy iteration algorithm in non-trivial ways.
Let σ be a strategy profile. For each state k ∈ S, we define the valuation ν(k, σ) = (u(k, σ), ℓ(k, σ)). I.e., the
valuation of a state k for strategy profile σ is the payoff for k combined with the length of the path Pk,σ . If
ν(k, σ) = (∞,∞) we write ν(k, σ) = ∞. We say that an action j ∈ Ak from state k is an improving switch
for Player 1 if:
(cj + u(d(j), σ), 1 + ℓ(d(j), σ)) < ν(k, σ)
Where we order pairs lexicographically, with the first component being most significant. I.e., an improving
switch for Player 1 either produces a path from k of smaller cost or with the same cost and smaller length.
If a path of smaller cost is produced we say that j is a strongly improving switch. Similarly, j ∈ Ak is an
improving switch for Player 2 if:
(cj + u(d(j), σ), 1 + ℓ(d(j), σ)) > ν(k, σ)
and j is a strongly improving switch for Player 2 if cj + u(d(j), σ) > u(k, σ).
The inclusion of the length in the definition of an improving switch is crucial since it should be an
improving switch for Player 2 to go from not using a self-loop of cost 0 to using a self-loop of cost 0 (if
Player 2 always uses a self-loop in state k, then ⊥ is never reached and thus Player 1 pays ∞ to Player 2.
That is the best payoff for Player 2). If the length is not included using a self-loop of cost 0 is never an
improving switch for either player.
Lemma 2.2 Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a strategy profile such that for both players i there are no improving switches
in Ai. Then σ1 and σ2 are optimal.
Proof: By Lemma 2.1 it is enough to show that (σ1, σ2) is a Nash equilibrium for play starting in each
state of the game.
Let σ′1 be a best response to σ2, and let σ
′ = (σ′1, σ2). Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that
there exists a k0 ∈ S such that u(k0, σ′) < u(k0, σ). Let ki be the i’th state on the path Pk0,σ′ . I.e.,
ki+1 = d(σ
′(ki)).
Either Pk0,σ′ leads to the terminal state ⊥, or Pk0,σ′ is an infinite path ending in a cycle. The second
case is impossible since that would imply u(k0, σ
′) =∞ < u(k0, σ).
Since σ′1 is a best response to σ2, we have u(ki, σ
′) ≤ u(ki, σ) for all i. Also, since u(⊥, σ
′) = u(⊥, σ) = 0
and u(k0, σ
′) < u(k0, σ), when Pk0,σ′ leads to the terminal state, there must exist an index i such that
u(ki+1, σ
′) = u(ki+1, σ) and u(ki, σ
′) < u(ki, σ). Thus, σ
′(ki) is an improving switch for Player 1, and since
σ(ki) 6= σ′(ki) we have ki ∈ S1; a contradiction.
The argument for Player 2 is similar. Let σ′2 be a best response to σ1, and σ
′ = (σ1, σ
′
2). Assume that
u(k0, σ
′) > u(k0, σ) for some k0 ∈ S, and let ki be the i’th state along the path Pk0,σ′ . For the case when
Pk0,σ′ leads to the terminal state, the argument is the same except with < and > interchanged.
When Pk0,σ′ is an infinite path ending in a cycle we must have u(k0, σ
′) =∞ > u(k0, σ). I.e., u(ki, σ) is
finite for all i. Recall that cj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ A. For all ki ∈ S1, σ(ki) = σ
′(ki), and, hence:
ν(ki, σ) = (cσ(ki) + u(ki+1, σ), 1 + ℓ(ki+1, σ)) > ν(ki+1, σ).
7
On the other hand, for all ki ∈ S2, σ′(ki) is not an improving switch for Player 2, and, hence:
ν(ki, σ) ≥ (cσ′(ki) + u(ki+1, σ), 1 + ℓ(ki+1, σ)) > ν(ki+1, σ).
Thus, Pk0,σ′ leads to a cycle, for which the valuations for σ decrease with each step; a contradiction.

Improving sets. Let B ⊆ A be a set of actions such that |B ∩ Ak| ≤ 1 for all k ∈ S, and, for B ∩ Ak 6= ∅,
let j(k,B) be the unique action in B ∩ Ak. Let σ be a strategy profile, and let σ[B] be defined as:
σ[B](k) :=
{
j(k,B) if B ∩ Ak 6= ∅
σ(k) otherwise.
If B = {j} we also write σ[j]. If j ∈ A is not an improving switch for one player, we say that j is weakly
improving for the other player. We say that B ⊆ A is an improving set for Player i if there exists an
improving switch j ∈ B for Player i, and for all j ∈ B, j is weakly improving for Player i.
Lemma 2.3 Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a strategy profile, and let B ⊆ A be an improving set for Player 1. Then
ν(k, σ[B]) ≤ ν(k, σ) for all k ∈ S, with strict inequality if σ[B](k0) is an improving switch for Player 1
w.r.t. σ. Similarly, if B is an improving set for Player 2, then ν(k, σ[B]) ≥ ν(k, σ) for all k ∈ S, with strict
inequality if σ[B](k0) is an improving switch for Player 1 w.r.t. σ.
Proof: First consider the case where B is an improving set for Player 1. Let k0 ∈ S. We must show that
ν(k0, σ[B]) ≤ ν(k0, σ) with strict inequality if σ[B](k0) is an improving switch for Player 1 w.r.t. σ. This is
clearly true if ν(k0, σ) =∞. Thus, assume that ν(k0, σ) <∞.
Let ki be the i’th state on the path Pk0,σ[B]. Since σ[B](ki) is weakly improving for Player 1 we have,
for all i:
(cσ[B](ki) + u(ki+1, σ), 1 + ℓ(ki+1, σ)) ≤ ν(ki, σ) (1)
with strict inequality exactly when σ[B](ki) is an improving switch for Player 1 w.r.t. σ.
From (1), and the fact that cj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ A, we get that:
ν(ki, σ) ≥ (cσ[B](ki) + u(ki+1, σ), 1 + ℓ(ki+1), σ))
> (u(ki+1, σ), ℓ(ki+1, σ))
= ν(ki+1, σ).
Hence, Pk0,σ[B] does not lead to a cycle, since the valuations in σ can not strictly decrease along the entire
cycle.
We next show, using backwards induction on i, that ν(ki, σ[B]) ≤ ν(ki, σ). For the base case, ki =⊥, the
statement is clearly true. Otherwise, for i < ℓ(k0, σ[B]), we get from (1) and the induction hypothesis that:
ν(ki, σ) ≥ (cσ[B](ki) + u(ki+1, σ), 1 + ℓ(ki+1, σ))
≥ (cσ[B](ki) + u(ki+1, σ[B]), 1 + ℓ(ki+1, σ[B]))
= ν(ki, σ[B]).
Note that if j ∈ Aki ∩B is an improving switch for Player 1 then the first inequality is strict.
The proof for the second case, where B is an improving set for Player 2, is similar. Let k0 ∈ S. We show
that ν(k0, σ[B]) ≥ ν(k0, σ) with strict inequality if σ[B](k0) is an improving switch for Player 2 w.r.t. σ.
Now, this is clearly true if ν(k0, σ[B]) = ∞. If ν(k0, σ[B]) < ∞, it immediately follows that Pk0,σ[B] is of
finite length. The rest of the proof is identical, but with < and > interchanged.

The following corollary is an important consequence of Lemma 2.3.
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Function StrategyIteration(G, σ)
while ∃ improving set B1 ⊆ A1 for Player 1 w.r.t. σ do
σ ← σ[B1];
while ∃ improving set B2 ⊆ A
2 for Player 2 w.r.t. σ do
σ ← σ[B2];
return (u(σ), σ);
Figure 4: The StrategyIteration algorithm for solving priced games.
Corollary 2.4 Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be a strategy profile for which Player 2 has no improving switches. Let
B ⊆ A1 be an improving set for Player 1, and let σ′ = (σ1[B], σ′2) where σ
′
2 is any strategy for Player 2.
Then ν(k, σ′) ≤ ν(k, σ) for all states k, with strict inequality if σ′(k) is an improving switch for Player 1.
Proof: Since Player 2 has no improving switches w.r.t. σ, every action j ∈ A2 emanating from a state
controlled by Player 2 is weakly improving for Player 1 w.r.t. σ. It follows that B ∪ σ′2 is an improving set
for Player 1, and we then know from Lemma 2.3 that ν(k, σ′) ≤ ν(k, σ) for all states k, with strict inequality
if σ′(k) is an improving switch for Player 1.

Lemma 2.2 and Corollary 2.4 allow us to define the StrategyIteration algorithm as shown in Figure 4.
u(σ) is the vector of payoffs for σ. The algorithm is a local search algorithm, and Lemma 2.2 ensures that
a local optimum is also a global optimum. Player 1 repeatedly performs improving switches while Player 2
always plays a best response to the current strategy of Player 1. Corollary 2.4 is used to prove termination
of the algorithm: it ensures that each strategy is only encountered once, and the number of strategies is
finite.
Theorem 2.5 The StrategyIteration algorithm correctly computes an optimal strategy profile σ∗ such
that neither player has an improving switch w.r.t. σ∗.
Proof: It immediately follows from Lemma 2.2 that if the StrategyIteration algorithm terminates, it
correctly computes an optimal strategy profile. Indeed, in order to escape both while-loops neither player i
can have an improving switch in Ai w.r.t. σ.
Let σ = (σ1, σ2) be the current strategy profile at the beginning of the outer while-loop, and let σ[B1] =
(σ′1, σ2). From Lemma 2.3 we know that with each iteration of the inner while-loop the valuations are
non-decreasing, with at least one state strictly increasing its valuation. Since there are only finitely many
strategies, it follows that the inner while-loop always terminates. Let the resulting strategy profile be
σ′ = (σ′1, σ
′
2). Observe that Player 2 has no improving switches in A
2 w.r.t. σ′.
After the first iteration Player 2 has no improving switches w.r.t. σ, and it follows from Corollary 2.4
that the valuations are non-increasing and strictly decreasing for at least one state from σ to σ′. Again,
since there are only finitely many strategies the outer while-loop is guaranteed to terminate.

3 Simple priced timed games
A simple priced timed game (SPTG) G is given by a priced game G′ = (S1, S2, (Ak)k∈S , (cj)j∈A, d), where
S = S1 ∪ S2 and A =
⋃
k∈S Ak, and for each state i ∈ S, an associated rate ri ∈ R≥0. We assume that
Ak 6= ∅ for all k ∈ S.
Playing an SPTG. A SPTG G is played as follows. A pebble is placed on some starting state k0 and the
clock is set to its starting time x0. The pebble is then moved from state to state by the players. The current
configuration of the game is described by a state and a time, forming a pair (k, x) ∈ S × [0, 1].
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Assume that after t steps the pebble is on state kt ∈ Si, controlled by Player i, at time xt, corresponding
to the configuration (kt, xt). Player i now chooses the next action jt ∈ Akt . Furthermore, the player also
chooses a delay δt ≥ 0 such that xt+1 = xt + δt ≤ 1. The pebble is moved to d(jt) = kt+1. The next
configuration is then (kt+1, xt+1). We write
(kt, xt)
jt,δt
−−−→ (kt+1, xt+1).
The game ends if kt+1 = ⊥.
Plays and outcomes. A play of the game is a sequence of steps starting from some configuration (k0, x0).
Let
ρ = (k0, x0)
j0,δ0
−−−→ (k1, x1)
j1,δ1
−−−→ . . .
jt−1,δt−1
−−−−−−→ (kt, xt)
be a finite play such that kt = ⊥. The outcome of the game, paid by Player 1 to Player 2, is then given by:
cost(ρ) =
t−1∑
ℓ=0
(δℓrkℓ + cjℓ).
I.e., for each unit of time spent waiting at a state k Player 1 pays the rate rk to Player 2. Furthermore,
every time an action j is used, Player 1 pays the cost cj to Player 2. If ρ is an infinite play the outcome is
∞, and we write cost(ρ) =∞.
Positional strategies. A (positional) strategy for Player i is a map πi : Si × [0, 1]→ A ∪ {λ}, where λ is
a special delay action. For every k ∈ Si and x ∈ [0, 1), if πi(k, x) = λ then we require that there exists a
δ > 0 such that for all 0 ≤ ǫ < δ, πi(k, x+ ǫ) = λ. Let δπi(k, x) = inf{x
′ − x | x ≤ x′ ≤ 1, πi(k, x
′) 6= λ} be
the delay before the pebble is moved when starting in state k at time x for some strategy πi. More general
types of strategies could be considered, but see Remark 3.1.
Playing according to a strategy and strategy profiles. Player i is said to play according to πi if,
when the pebble is in state k ∈ Si at time x ∈ [0, 1], he waits until time x
′ = x + δπi(k, x) and then moves
according to πi(k, x
′). A strategy profile π = (π1, π2) is a pair of strategies, one for each player. Let Πi be
the set of strategies for Player i, and let Π be the set of all strategy profiles. A strategy profile π is again
interpreted as a map π : S × [0, 1]→ A ∪ {λ}. Furthermore, we use π(x) to refer to the decisions at a fixed
time. I.e., π(x) : S → A ∪ {λ} is the map defined by (π(x))(k) = π(k, x).
Value functions and optimal strategies. Let ρπk,x be the play starting from configuration (k, x) where
the players play according to π. Define the value function for a strategy profile π = (π1, π2) and state k
as: vπ1,π2k (x) = cost(ρ
π
k,x). For fixed strategies π1 and π2 for Player 1 and 2, define the best response value
functions for Player 2 and 1, respectively, for a state k as:
vπ1k (x) = sup
π2∈Π2
vπ1,π2k (x)
vπ2k (x) = inf
π1∈Π1
vπ1,π2k (x)
We again define lower and upper value functions :
vk(x) = sup
π2∈Π2
vπ2k (x) = sup
π2∈Π2
inf
π1∈Π1
vπ1,π2k (x).
vk(x) = inf
π1∈Π1
vπ1k (x) = inf
π1∈Π1
sup
π2∈Π2
vπ1,π2k (x).
Note that inf and sup are used because there are infinitely many strategies. Bouyer et al. [8] showed that
vk(x) = vk(x). In fact, this was shown for the more general class of priced timed games (PTGs) studied in
Section 4. Thus, every SPTG has a value function vk(x) := vk(x) = vk(x) for each state k.
Remark 3.1 Let us remark that positional strategies are commonly defined as maps from states and times
to delays and actions. For instance, positional strategies (CDPS) are commonly defined as τi : Si × [0, 1]→
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[0, 1] × A. This is more general than our definition of strategies, since τi(k, x) = (δ, a) with δ > 0 does
not imply that for all x′ ∈ (x, x + δ] we have τi(k, x′) = (x + δ − x′, a), whereas this implication holds for
the strategies we use. We choose to use the specialized definition of strategies because it offers a better
intuition for understanding the proposed algorithm. It is easy to see that the players can not achieve better
values by using the more general strategies. Indeed, let τi be some strategy where τi(k, x) = (δ, a) and
τi(k, x
′) = (δ′, a′), such that [x, x + δ] ∩ [x′, x′ + δ′] 6= ∅. Then one of the following two modifications will
not make τi achive worse values: τi(k, x) = (x
′ + δ′ − x, a′) or τi(k, x′) = (x+ δ − x′, a). Even more general
strategies can be considered that depends on the history of the play so far in arbitary ways, but as shown
by Bouyer et al. [8] for any ǫ > 0 there exists a CDPS π1 for Player 1, such that against any strategy π2 for
Player 2 vπ1,π2k (x) ≥ vk(x)− ǫ (and similar if Player 2 must play a CDPS). Thus the same is the case for our
more specialised positional strategies. That we only consider positional strategies is thus not a restriction.
Strategies optimal from some time. A strategy πi ∈ Πi is optimal from time x for Player i if:
∀k ∈ S, x′ ∈ [x, 1] : vπik (x
′) = vk(x
′).
Strategies are called optimal if they are optimal from time 0. Similarly, a strategy πi is a best response to
another strategy π−i from time x if:
∀k ∈ S, x′ ∈ [x, 1] : v
πi,π−i
k (x
′) = v
π−i
k (x
′).
Nash equilibrium from some time. A strategy profile (π1, π2) is called a Nash equilibrium from time
x if π1 is a best response to π2 from time x, and π2 is a best response to π1 from time x. As in the case
of Lemma 2.1 for priced games, any equilibrium payoff of an SPTG is the value of the game. The exact
statement is shown in Lemma 3.2. Since the argument is standard, and similar to the proof of Lemma 2.1, it
has been omitted. Just note that instead of considering best responses, which we have not yet showed exist
for SPTGs, it suffices to use some better strategy.
Lemma 3.2 If there exists a strategy profile (π1, π2) that is a Nash equilibrium from time x, then vk(x
′) =
vπ1,π2k (x
′) for all k ∈ S and x′ ∈ [x, 1].
The existence of optimal strategies and best replies is non-trivial. We are, however, later going to prove
the following theorem, which, in particular, implies that inf and sup can be replaced by min and max in the
definitions of value functions. (That value functions are piecewise linear also holds for general PTGs and was
first established by Bouyer et al. [8] who furthermore showed that the value functions are not continuous
in general and that there are PTGs for which no optimal strategy exists, thus showing that we can not in
general replace inf and sup by min and max.)
Theorem 3.3 For any SPTG there exists an optimal strategy profile. Also, the value functions are contin-
uous piecewise linear functions.
Our proof will be algorithmic. Specifically, the algorithm SolveSPTG computes a value function of the
desired kind. Furthermore, the proof of correctness of SolveSPTG (the proof of Theorem 3.12) also yields
the existence of exactly optimal strategies.
We refer to the non-differentiable points of the value functions of G as event points of G. The number of
distinct event points of G is an important parameter in the complexity of our algorithm for solving SPTGs.
We denote by L(G) the total number of event points, excluding x = 1.
3.1 Solving SPTGs
In order to solve an SPTG we make use of a technique similar to the sweep-line technique from computational
geometry of Shamos and Hoey [16]. Informally, we construct the value functions by moving a sweep-line
backwards from time 1 to time 0, and at each time computing the current values based on the later values.
11
The approach is also similar to a technique known in game theory as backward induction. The parameter
of the induction, the time, is a continuous parameter, however. The BCFL-ABM algorithm also applies
backward induction, but there the parameter of induction is the number of transitions taken, i.e., a discrete
parameter, leading to a value iteration algorithm.
Informal description of the algorithm. If π is a strategy profile that is optimal from time x in an SPTG
G, we use π to construct a new strategy profile π′ that is optimal from time x′ < x. More precisely, for
x′ sufficiently close to x, we show that there exists a fixed optimal action (where ”waiting” is viewed as an
action) for all states for both players for every point in time in the interval [x′, x). The new strategy profile
π′ is then obtained from π by using these actions. Starting from time x′, once the players wait in some state
k, they wait at least until time x because they use the same actions throughout the interval. This allows us
to model the situation with a priced game where every state k is given an additional action λk corresponding
to waiting for y = x−x′ units of time. Thus, the value of a state in the priced game is the same as the value
of the corresponding state in G if the game starts at time x′ = x− y, and if the first time a player waits he
is forced to wait until time x. The formal development of the algorithm follows. The following definition is
a formalization of the priced game described above.
Definition 3.4 For a given SPTG G = (S1, S2, (Ak)k∈S , c, d, r), a time x ∈ (0, 1], and y ≥ 0, let the priced
game Gx,y = (S1, S2, (A
′
k)k∈S , c
x,y, d′) be defined by:
∀k ∈ S : A′k = Ak ∪ {λk}
∀j ∈ A′k : c
x,y
j =
{
vk(x) + yrk if j = λk
cj otherwise
∀j ∈ A′k : d
′(j) =
{
⊥ if j = λk
d(j) otherwise
We refer to actions λk, for k ∈ S, as waiting actions.
We sometimes write u(k, σ,Gx,y) instead of u(k, σ) to clarify which priced game Gx,y we consider.
The rates obtained in Gx,y. Let x ∈ (0, 1] and y ≥ 0. Let σ be a strategy profile for Gx,y, and let k0 be a
state. Consider the (maximal) path Pk0,σ = (k0, k1, . . . ) that starts at k0 and uses actions of σ. When Pk0,σ
is finite and the last action of Pk0,σ is a waiting action λk for some k, it is useful to introduce notation for
refering to the rate of the second last state of Pk0,σ. (Note that the last state of Pk0,σ is the terminal state
⊥.) For this purpose we define:
r(k0, σ) =
{
rkt−1 if Pk0,σ = (k0, k1, . . . , kt) and σ(kt−1) = λkt−1
0 otherwise
Note that for finite paths that move to ⊥ without using waiting actions we may interpret the rate of ⊥
as being 0. We again sometimes write r(k, σ,Gx,y) instead of r(k, σ) to clarify which priced game Gx,y we
consider. Note that the only differences between Gx,y and Gx,y
′
for y 6= y′ are the costs of the waiting
actions. Also note that r(k0, σ) does not depend on y. In particular, we always have:
u(k0, σ,G
x,y) = u(k0, σ,G
x,0) + yr(k0, σ) . (2)
The game Gx. We will often let y be the infinitesimal ǫ, in which case we simply denote Gx,ǫ by Gx and
cx,ǫ by cx. Since ǫ is an infinitesimal, the payoffs of a strategy profile σ for Gx have two components. From
(2) we (informally) know that u(k0, σ,G
x) = u(k0, σ,G
x,0) + ǫr(k0, σ). There are no infinitesimals in G
x,0,
and, hence, the second component of the payoff u(k0, σ,G
x) is exactly r(k0, σ). For every x ∈ (0, 1] we let
σx = (σx1 , σ
x
2 ) be a strategy profile for which neither player has an improving switch. I.e., by Lemma 2.2 σ
x
is an optimal strategy profile for Gx. The existence of σx is guaranteed by Theorem 2.5. To shorten notation
we let ax(k) = u(k, σx, Gx,0) and bx(k) = r(k, σx, Gx).
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Lemma 3.5 The strategy profile σx is optimal for Gx,0 and ax(k) = vk(x).
Proof: To prove the first part of the lemma we observe that if a better value can be achieved in Gx,0
then, regardless of the infinitesimal component of the payoff achieved by σx in Gx, it will also be better
for Gx. Furthermore, the value of a state k in Gx,0 must be consistent with vk(x). It follows that a
x(k) =
u(k, σx, Gx,0) = vk(x). 
Note that the only difference between Gx and Gx
′
, for x 6= x′, is the costs of the waiting actions λk.
Hence, we may interpret a strategy profile σ for Gx as a strategy profile for Gx
′
. Also note that Gx is
identical to the priced game G′ defining G, except that for each state k there is an additional action λk
corresponding to waiting in that state in the SPTG. Slightly abusing notation, we will interpret actions
chosen by σ as also being actions π(x) for G, and the actions of π(x) as forming a strategy profile for Gx.
The following lemma establishes the connection between the SPTG G and the priced game Gx, for some
x ∈ (0, 1].
Lemma 3.6 Let π be a strategy profile for G that is optimal from time x, and let x′ < x. If π(x′′) = σx for
all x′′ ∈ [x′, x), then vπk (x
′) = vk(x) + (x− x′)bx(k) for all k ∈ S.
Proof: Let ρπk,x′ = (k0, x0)
j0,δ0
−−−→ (k1, x1)
j1,δ1
−−−→ . . . , and let t be the maximum index such that xt < x.
Since π(x′′) = σx for all x′′ ∈ [x′, x), we have δℓ = 0 for all ℓ < t and δt ≥ x − x′. By splitting the cost of
ρπk,x′ into cost accumulated before and after time x, we get:
vπk (x
′) = cost(ρπk,x′)
=
(
(x − x′)rkt +
t−1∑
ℓ=0
cjℓ
)
+ vkt(x)
= u(k, σx, Gx,0) + (x− x′)r(k, σx, Gx)
= ax(k) + (x− x′)bx(k)
= vk(x) + (x − x
′)bx(k) .
The last equality follows from Lemma 3.5. 
The function NextEventPoint(Gx). For every action j ∈ A and time x ∈ (0, 1], define the function:
fj,x(x
′′) := cj + u(d(j), σ
x, Gx,x−x
′′
)
= cj + a
x(d(j)) + (x− x′′)bx(d(j)) .
I.e., fj,x(x
′′), for j ∈ Ak, is the payoff obtained in Gx,x−x
′′
by starting at state k, using action j, and then
repeatedly using actions of σx. In particular, we have u(k, σx, Gx,x−x
′′
) = fσx(k),x(x
′′), and j ∈ Ak, for
k ∈ S1, is a strongly improving switch for Player 1 w.r.t. σx if and only if fj,x(x′′) < fσx(k),x(x
′′). A similar
observation can be made for Player 2. Note that fj,x(x
′′) defines a line in the plane.
From the definition of σx we know that σx is optimal for Gx,x−x
′′
when x′′, with x′′ < x, is sufficiently
close to x. In the following we will be interested in making x′′ as small as possible while maintaining that
σx is optimal for Gx,x−x
′′
. Recall that σx is optimal for Gx,x−x
′′
if neither player has an improving switch
w.r.t. σx. Also, there are no improving switches when y = x − x′′ > 0 is sufficiently small. Recall that the
valuation ν(k, σx, Gx,y) = (u(k, σx, Gx,y), ℓ(k, σx, Gx,y)) consists of two components. Although the payoffs
u(k, σx, Gx,y) change for different y, the path lengths ℓ(k, σx, Gx,y) remain the same. Hence, there are no
improving switches w.r.t. σx for Gx,x−x
′′
if and only if:
∀k ∈ S1, j ∈ Ak : (fσx(k),x(x
′′), ℓ(k, σx, Gx,0)) ≥ (fj,x(x
′′), 1 + ℓ(d(j), σx, Gx,0)) (3)
∀k ∈ S2, j ∈ Ak : (fσx(k),x(x
′′), ℓ(k, σx, Gx,0)) ≤ (fj,x(x
′′), 1 + ℓ(d(j), σx, Gx,0)) (4)
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where the pairs are compared lexicographically.
Let x′ be the first intersection before x of two lines fσx(k),x(x
′′) and fj,x(x
′′), for k ∈ S and j ∈ Ak \ σx.
Then (3) and (4) are satisfied for all x′′ ∈ (x′, x), since (3) and (4) are satisfied for x′′ sufficiently close to x,
and the relations (inequalities) between fσx(k),x(x
′′) and fj,x(x
′′) remain the same for all k ∈ S and j ∈ Ak.
In particular, neither player has a strongly improving switch w.r.t. σx for Gx,x−x
′′
when x′′ ∈ [x′x). On the
other hand, either (3) or (4) is no longer satisfied when x′′ < x′. Hence, σx is optimal for Gx,x−x
′′
when
x′ < x′′ < x, but not when x′′ < x′. Note also that if σx is optimal for Gx,x−x
′′
for all x′′ ∈ (x′, x), then σx
is also optimal for Gx,x−x
′
. Indeed, assume for the sake of contradiction that σx is not optimal for Gx,x−x
′
,
then when x′′ is sufficiently close to x′ it must also be possible for one of the players to improve his value
in Gx,x−x
′′
by switching to an optimal strategy for Gx,x−x
′
; a contradiction. Hence, we have shown that
x′′ = x′ is the smallest time for which σx remains optimal for Gx,x−x
′′
. Note that although σx is optimal for
Gx,x−x
′
it is still possible that some player has an improving switch that improves the path lengths without
changing the payoffs.
We define NextEventPoint(Gx) to be the time x′ of the first intersection before x of two lines fσx(k),x(x
′′)
and fj,x(x
′′), for k ∈ S and j ∈ Ak \ σx. We will later see that x′ is the next event point preceding x, which
justifies the name. We next derive a concise definition of NextEventPoint(Gx). Note that x′ must satisfy
fj,x(x
′) = fπ(k),x(x
′) and fj,x(x) 6= fπ(k),x(x) for some k ∈ S and j ∈ Ak. I.e., if fj,x(x
′′) = fσx(k),x(x
′′) for
all x′′, then j can never be an improving switch w.r.t. σx, and we may ignore the action j when looking for
x′. Since we are working with lines it is enough to check two different points to see whether two lines are
the same. It follows that NextEventPoint(Gx) can be defined as:
max {0} ∪ {x′ ∈ [0, x) | ∃k ∈ S, j ∈ Ak : fj,x(x
′) = fπ(k),x(x
′) ∧ fj,x(x) 6= fπ(k),x(x)}.
Note that NextEventPoint(Gx) is well-defined, since there is only one function fj,x for each action j ∈ A.
The following lemma follows as a consequence of the discussion above.
Lemma 3.7 Let x′ = NextEventPoint(Gx), then σx is optimal for Gx,y, for all y ∈ (0, x−x′]. Furthermore,
neither player has a strongly improving switch w.r.t. σx for Gx,y.
We are now ready to state the main technical lemma used to prove the correctness of our algorithm.
Lemma 3.8 Let x′ = NextEventPoint(Gx), and let π = (π1, π2) be a strategy profile that is optimal from
time x. Then the strategy profile π′ = (π′1, π
′
2), defined by:
π′(k, x′′) =
{
σx(k) if x′′ ∈ [x′, x)
π(k, x′′) otherwise
is optimal from time x′, and vk(x
′′) = vk(x) + b
x(k)(x− x′′), for x′′ ∈ [x′, x) and k ∈ S.
Proof: Let us first note that for any strategy profile π′′, the outcome vπ
′′
k0
(x0), for some starting configuration
(k0, x0), only depends on the choices made by π
′′ in the interval [x0, 1]. Hence, since π
′ is the same as π in
the interval [x, 1], π′ is also optimal from time x.
Let us also note that vk(x
′′) =∞ for some k ∈ S and x′′ ∈ [0, 1] if and only if vk(x′′) =∞ for all x′′ ∈ [0, 1].
Indeed, the value is infinite exactly when the play has infinite length, and this property is independent of
time. Hence, costs and rates are of no importance. vk(x
′′) is, thus, correctly set to ∞ if vk(x) = ∞. For
the remainder of the proof we focus on the case where vk(x) <∞. It follows immediately from Lemma 3.6
that the value function has the correct form in the interval [x′, x). I.e., vπ
′
k (x
′′) = vk(x) + b
x(k)(x− x′′), for
x′′ ∈ [x′, x).
We next show that π′ is optimal from time x′. From Lemma 3.2 we know that it suffices to show that
π′ = (π′1, π
′
2) is a Nash equilibrium from time x
′. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there exists a
strategy π′′1 , a state k0, and a time x0 ∈ [x
′, x), such that v
π′′1 ,π
′
2
k0
(x0) < v
π′1,π
′
2
k0
(x0). Consider the finite play
ρ
π′′1 ,π
′
2
k0,x0
= (k0, x0)
j0,δ0
−−−→ (k1, x1)
j1,δ1
−−−→ . . .
jt−1,δt−1
−−−−−−→ (kt, xt) ,
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and assume for simplicity that, if xt ≥ x, a configuration appears at time x. Let ℓ > 0 be the minimum
index such that v
π′′1 ,π
′
2
kℓ′
(xℓ′) ≥ v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ′
(xℓ′) for all ℓ
′ ≥ ℓ. Note that since the play is finite, meaning that kt
is the terminal state, we have v
π′′1 ,π
′
2
kt
(xt) = v
π′1,π
′
2
kt
(xt) = 0. Hence, ℓ is well-defined. Also, since (π
′
1, π
′
2) is
optimal from time x, and x appears in a configuration of the play if xt ≥ x, we must have xℓ ≤ x.
Observe that:
v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ−1) > v
π′′1 ,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ−1)
= (xℓ − xℓ−1)rkℓ−1 + cjℓ−1 + v
π′′1 ,π
′
2
kℓ
(xℓ)
≥ (xℓ − xℓ−1)rkℓ−1 + cjℓ−1 + v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ
(xℓ) .
Continuing this line of thought we next prove that cjℓ−1 + v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ
(xℓ) ≥ v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ), which shows that:
v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ−1) > (xℓ − xℓ−1)rkℓ−1 + v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ) . (5)
We consider two cases: (i) kℓ−1 ∈ S2, and (ii) kℓ−1 ∈ S1. (i) if kℓ−1 ∈ S2 then v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ) = cjℓ−1 +v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ
(xℓ)
because ρ
π′′1 ,π
′
2
k0,x0
is also defined by π′2. The second case (ii) where kℓ−1 ∈ S1 is slightly more involved. Assume
for the sake of contradiction that cjℓ−1 + v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ
(xℓ) < v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ). Then jℓ−1 is a strongly improving switch
w.r.t. σx for Gx,0 for Player 1, and therefore also for Gx. This, however, contradicts that neither player has
an improving switch w.r.t. σx for Gx.
As argued above we have that vπ
′
k (x
′′) = vk(x) + b
x(k)(x − x′′), for all states k and x′′ ∈ [x′, x). From
(5) we therefore get:
v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ−1) > (xℓ − xℓ−1)rkℓ−1 + v
π′1,π
′
2
kℓ−1
(xℓ) ⇒
vkℓ−1(x) + b
x(kℓ−1)(x− xℓ−1) > (xℓ − xℓ−1)rkℓ−1 + vkℓ−1(x) + b
x(kℓ−1)(x − xℓ) ⇒
vkℓ−1(x) + b
x(kℓ−1)(xℓ − xℓ−1) > (xℓ − xℓ−1)rkℓ−1 + vkℓ−1(x) (6)
Let y = xℓ − xℓ−1. From Lemma 3.5 we know that vk(x) = ax(k) = u(k, σx, Gx,0) for all k. It then follows
from (2) that the left-hand-side of (6) is equal to u(kℓ−1, σ
x, Gx,y). Observe also that the right-hand-side
of (6) is equal to cx,yλkℓ−1
. Hence, (6) shows that λkℓ−1 is a strongly improving switch w.r.t. σ
x in Gx,y.
Since xℓ−1, xℓ ∈ [x
′, x] and xℓ−1 < xℓ we have y ∈ (0, x − x
′]. It then follows from Lemma 3.7 that neither
player has a strongly improving switch w.r.t. σx for Gx,y, and we get a contradiction. Thus, π′ is a Nash
equilibrium from time x′.
The case for Player 2 is analogous.
Let us note that the same proof would not immediately work for the more general strategies described
in Remark 3.1. 
Proof of correctness of the algorithm. Lemma 3.8 allows us to compute optimal strategies by backward
induction once the values vk(1) at time 1 are known for all states k ∈ S. Finding vk(1) and corresponding
optimal strategies from time 1 is, fortunately, not difficult. Indeed, when x = 1 time does not increase
further, and we simply solve the priced game G′ that defines G. The resulting algorithm is shown in
Figure 5. Note that the choice of first using the ExtendedDijkstra algorithm of Khachiyan et al. [13] and
then the StrategyIteration algorithm is to facilitate the analysis in Section 3.2. In fact, any algorithm
for solving priced games could be used. By observing that SolveSPTG repeatedly applies Lemma 3.8 to
construct optimal strategies by backward induction we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9 If SolveSPTG terminates, it correctly computes the value function and optimal strategies for
both players.
Note that SolveSPTG resembles the sweep-line algorithm of Shamos and Hoey [16] for the line segment
intersection problem. At every time x we have n ordered sets of line segments with an intersection within
one set at the next event point x′ = NextEventPoint(Gx). When handling the event point, the order of the
line segments is updated, and we move on to the next event point.
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Function SolveSPTG(G)
(v(1), (π1(1), π2(1)))← ExtendedDijkstra(G′);
x← 1;
while x > 0 do
(ax(k) + ǫbx(k), (σ1, σ2))← StrategyIteration(Gx, (π1(x), π2(x)));
x′ ← NextEventPoint(Gx);
forall k ∈ S and x′′ ∈ [x′, x) do
vk(x
′′)← vk(x) + bx(k)(x − x′′);
π1(k, x
′′)← σ1(k);
π2(k, x
′′)← σ2(k);
x← x′;
return (v, (π1, π2));
Figure 5: Algorithm for solving a simple priced timed game G = (G′, (rk)k∈S).
3.2 Bounding the number of event points
Let G be an SPTG. Recall that the only difference between Gx and Gx
′
, for x 6= x′, are the costs of actions
λk, for k ∈ S, if vk(x) 6= vk(x′). The actions available from each state are therefore the same, and a strategy
profile σ for Gx can, thus, also be interpreted as a strategy profile for Gx
′
. To bound the number of event
points we assign a potential to each strategy profile σ, such that the potential strictly decreases when one
of the players performs a single improving switch. Furthermore, the potential is defined independently of
the values vk(x). It then follows that the number of single improving switches performed by the SolveSPTG
algorithm is at most the total number of strategy profiles for Gx. We further improve this bound to show
that the number of event points is at most exponential in the number of states. This improves the previous
bound by Rutkowski [15].
The function count(σ, i, ℓ, r). Let n be the number of states of G, let N be the number of distinct
rates, including rate 0 for the terminal state ⊥. Assume that the distinct rates are ordered such that
r1 < r2 < · · · < rN . Recall that r(k, σ) is the rate of the waiting state reached from k in σ. Let
count(σ, i, ℓ, r) = |{k ∈ Si | ℓ(k, σ) = ℓ ∧ r(k, σ) = r}|
be the number of states controlled by Player i at distance ℓ from ⊥ in σ that reach a waiting state with rate
r.
The potential matrix. For every strategy profile σ for the priced games Gx, for x ∈ (0, 1], define the
potential P (σ) ∈ Nn×N as an integer matrix as follows.
P (σ)ℓ,r = count(σ, 2, ℓ, r)− count(σ, 1, ℓ, r)
I.e., rows correspond to lengths, columns correspond to rates, and entries count the number of corresponding
Player 2 controlled states minus the number of corresponding Player 1 controlled states.
Ordering the potential matrices. We define a lexicographic ordering of potential matrices where, firstly,
entries corresponding to lower rates are of higher importance. Secondly, entries corresponding to shorter
lengths are more important. Formally, we write P (σ) ≺ P (σ′) if and only if there exists ℓ and r such that:
• P (σ)ℓ′,r′ = P (σ′)ℓ′,r′ for all r′ < r and 1 ≤ ℓ′ ≤ n.
• P (σ)ℓ′,r = P (σ′)ℓ′,r for all ℓ′ < ℓ.
• P (σ)ℓ,r < P (σ′)ℓ,r.
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P (σ(1)) =


0 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0
−1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


P (σ(2)) =


−1 0 −1 1
0 0 −1 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


P (σ(3)) =


−1 1 0 1
−1 −1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


P (σ(4)) =


−1 0 −1 1
−1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0


Figure 6: Example of potential matrices of the strategy profiles from Figure 1.
Example. Figure 6 shows an example of the potential matrices of the strategy profiles shown in Figure 1.
We use the following notation:
• σ(1) is the strategy profile used at time x = 1,
• σ(2) is the strategy profile used at time x ∈ [2/3, 1),
• σ(3) is the strategy profile used at time x ∈ [1/3, 2/3),
• and σ(4) is the strategy profile used at time x ∈ [0, 1/3).
σ(1) is also shown in Figure 2. Observe that P (σ(1))1,1 = 0 because states 1 and 5 are controlled by Player
2 and 1, respectively, and both move directly to ⊥, which has rate 0 (thus the entry is 0 because we add 1
because of state 1 and subtract 1 because of state 5). Also note that the potentials do indeed decrease for
the four matrices. At each event point the strategies are updated for multiple states, however.
Lemma 3.10 Let σ be a strategy profile that is optimal for Gx,0, for some x ∈ (0, 1]. Let j ∈ Ai be an
improving switch for Player i w.r.t. σ in the priced game Gx. Then P (σ[j]) ≺ P (σ).
Proof: Consider the game Gx. Recall that for every strategy profile σ′ and state k ∈ S, we let u(k, σ′, Gx) =
u(k, σ′, Gx,0)+ ǫr(k, σ′), where ǫ is an infinitesimal. Since σ is optimal for Gx,0 we must have u(k, σ,Gx,0) =
u(k, σ[j], Gx,0) for all k ∈ S. Indeed, otherwise j would be a strongly improving switch w.r.t. σ in Gx,0,
implying that σ is not optimal for Gx,0.
Let k be the state from which the action j originates. It then follows that u(k, σ) 6=∞ and u(k, σ[j]) 6=∞.
I.e., it is not possible for exactly one of the payoffs to be infinite, and if both payoffs are infinite then j would
not be an improving switch.
Assume that i = 1. Since j ∈ Ak is an improving switch for Player 1 we have ν(k, σ[j]) < ν(k, σ). It is,
thus, either the case that r(k, σ[j]) < r(k, σ), or that r(k, σ[j]) = r(k, σ) and ℓ(k, σ[j]) < ℓ(k, σ). In both
cases the most significant entry ℓ, r for which P (σ)ℓ,r 6= P (σ[j])ℓ,r is ℓ = ℓ(k, σ[j]) and r = r(k, σ[j]). Indeed,
all states with new valuations in σ[j] move through state k and, thus, have same rates but larger lengths.
Since i = 1 we have P (σ)ℓ,r < P (σ[j])ℓ,r and, thus, P (σ[j]) ≺ P (σ).
The case for i = 2 is similar. j ∈ Ak is an improving switch for Player 2, implying that either r(k, σ[j]) >
r(k, σ), or r(k, σ[j]) = r(k, σ) and ℓ(k, σ[j]) > ℓ(k, σ). The most significant entry ℓ, r for which P (σ)ℓ,r 6=
P (σ[j])ℓ,r is then ℓ = ℓ(k, σ) and r = r(k, σ). Since i = 2 we again have P (σ)ℓ,r < P (σ[j])ℓ,r and subsequently
P (σ[j]) ≺ P (σ).

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Theorem 3.11 The total number of event points for any SPTG G with n states is L(G) ≤ min{12n,
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+
1)}. Furthermore, if there is only one player then L(G) = O(n2).
Proof: Consider the variant of the SolveSPTG algorithm where StrategyIteration only performs single
improving switches for both players. I.e., when solving Gx, for some x ∈ (0, 1], Player 1 performs one
improving switch, then Player 2 repeatedly performs single improving switches as long as possible, and then
the process is repeated. The resulting optimal strategy profile σx is then used as the starting point for
solving the next priced game Gx
′
, for x′ = NextEventPoint(Gx).
Once the initial strategy profile σ = (π1(1), π2(1)) is found, any strategy profile σ
′ that is subsequently
produced by the StrategyIteration algorithm at some time x is optimal for the priced game Gx,0. I.e.,
σx is optimal for all Gx
′′
with x′′ ∈ (x′, x], where x′ = NextEventPoint(Gx). In particular, the payoffs
resulting from σx and σx
′
in Gx
′
only differ by some second order term. Hence, we can apply Lemma 3.10
to the strategy profiles, and conclude that the potential decreases with every improving switch. From this
we immediately get that the total number of strategy profiles in Gx,
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+ 1), is an upper bound on
L(G).
We next show that L(G) ≤ 12n. A matrix P ∈ Nn×N corresponding to a legal potential can always be
constructed in the following way. Let each entry (ℓ, r) be associated with a set Sℓ,r of corresponding states.
I.e., Sℓ,r contains the states for which it takes ℓmoves to reach⊥ in the priced game, and the rate encountered
is the r’th smallest rate of the game. Pick a non-empty subset of the columns C ⊆ {1, . . . , N}. This will
be the columns, such that in column r, there is an ℓ such that count(σ, 2, ℓ, r) 6= 0 or count(σ, 1, ℓ, r) 6= 0.
This can be done in at most 2N − 1 ≤ 2n+1 ways. Next, assign states to the sets of the entries. If Sℓ,r 6= ∅,
then we must also have Sℓ′,r 6= ∅ for all ℓ
′ < ℓ, by definition. This allows us to assign states to sets in an
ordered way. Let (ℓ, r) be the current entry starting from ℓ = 1 and r = min C. The current entry will be
lexicographic increasing in (r, ℓ). Repeatedly add a state from either S1 or S2 to Sℓ,r and update the current
entry in one of the following three ways:
• Do nothing: More states will be assigned to Sℓ,r.
• Move to the next row: No more states will be assigned to Sℓ,r, but some will be assigned to Sℓ,r+1.
• Move to the beginning of the next column of C: No more states will be assigned to Sℓ,r′ for any r
′.
There are n (one for each state in the game) such iterations, and in each iteration there are at most six
possible options. Hence, the states can be added in at most 6n ways. Furthermore, we do not need to update
the current entry after the last state has been added, which saves us a factor of 3. The total number of
possible matrices P is, thus, at most 12n.
When there is only one player i the argument becomes much simpler. Observe that the rates change
monotonically when going back in time: if i = 1 the rates decrease, and if i = 2 the rates increase.
Furthermore, at every event point at least one state changes rate. Hence, there can be at most nN ≤ n(n+1)
event points.

Theorem 3.12 SolveSPTG solves any SPTG G in time O(m ·min{12n,
∏
k∈S(|Ak| + 1)}) in the unit cost
model, where n is the number of states and m is the number of actions. Alternatively, the variant of
SolveSPTG that uses the ExtendedDijkstra algorithm instead of StrategyIteration solves G in time
O(L(G)(m + n logn)).
Proof: The correctness of SolveSPTG follows from Theorems 3.9 and 3.11.
For the first bound we get from the proof of Theorem 3.11 that, in fact, not only the number of event
points, but also the number of single improving switches is bounded by min{12n,
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+1)}. Valuations
for a strategy profile σ can be computed in time O(n), and then the next event point can be computed in
time O(m). I.e., for each k ∈ S we find the next event point at time x among the intersections of fσ(k),x and
fj,x, for j ∈ Ak.
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For the second bound we are using the ExtendedDijkstra algorithm of Khachiyan et al. [13] instead of
StrategyIteration in the inner while-loop. The ExtendedDijkstra algorithm has the same complexity as
Dijkstra’s algorithm2. Fredman and Tarjan [10] showed that, using Fibonacci heaps, Dijkstra’s algorithm can
solve the single source shortest path problem for a graph with n vertices and m edges in time O(m+n logn).

Theorem 3.3 follows as a corollary of Theorem 3.12, since SolveSPTG is always guaranteed to compute
optimal strategies, and the resulting value functions are continuous piecewise linear functions.
4 Priced timed games
One-clock priced timed games (PTGs) extend SPTGs in two ways. First, actions are associated with time
intervals during which they are available, and second, certain actions will cause the time to be reset to zero.
Also, we do not require the time to run from zero to one.
Formal definition of PTGs. Formally, a PTG G can be described by a tuple
G = (S1, S2, (Ak)k∈S , (cj)j∈A, d, (rk)k∈S , (Ij)j∈A, R),
where S = S1 ∪ S2 and A =
⋃
k∈S Ak. The complete description of the individual components of G is as
follows. Note that only the last two components are new compared to priced games and SPTGs.
• Si, for i ∈ {1, 2}, is a set of states controlled by Player i.
• Ak, for k ∈ S, is a set of actions available from state k.
• cj ∈ R≥0 ∪ {∞}, for j ∈ A, is the cost of action j ∈ A.
• d : A→ S ∪ {⊥} is a mapping from actions to destinations with ⊥ being the terminal state.
• rk ∈ R≥0, for k ∈ S, is the rate for waiting at state k.
• Ij , for j ∈ A, is the existence interval (a real interval) of action j during which it is available.
• R ⊆ A is the set of reset actions.
The class (n,m, r, d)-PTG. To simplify the statements of many of the remaining lemmas we let (n,m, r, d)-
PTG be the class of all PTGs consisting of n states, r of which are the destination of some reset action, m
actions and d distinct endpoints of existence intervals.
End points of intervals. We let e(I) be the set of endpoints of interval I, and define M = max∪j∈A e(Ij).
I.e., after time M no actions are available and the game must end. Note that PTGs are often defined with
existence intervals for both states and actions. For convenience, we decided to omit this feature since it is
not difficult to translate between the two version.
Playing PTGs. PTGs are played like SPTGs with the exception that using a reset transition resets the
time to zero and that the actions must be available when used. We, thus, again operate with configurations
(k, x) ∈ S× [0,M ] corresponding to a pebble being placed on state k at time x. The player controlling state
k chooses an action j ∈ Ak and a delay δ ≥ 0, such that j is available at time x + δ. I.e., x + δ ∈ Ij . We
assume for simplicity that such an action is always available. The pebble is then moved to state d(j), the
time is incremented to x + δ if j 6∈ R and reset to zero otherwise, and the play continues. The game ends
when the terminal state ⊥ is reached.
2To get this bound for the Extended Dijkstra’s algorithm, actions of the maximizer should not be inserted into the priortiy
queue. Instead, a choice of action for the maximizer for a state is fixed when the values of all possible successors of that state
are known.
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Play and outcomes. We again let a play be a sequence of legal steps starting from some configuration
(k0, x0):
ρ = (k0, x0)
j0,δ0
−−−→ (k1, x1)
j1,δ1
−−−→ . . .
where, for all ℓ ≥ 0, xℓ+ δℓ ∈ Ijℓ , and if jℓ ∈ R then xℓ+1 = 0. The outcome of infinite plays and finite plays
ending at the terminal state ⊥ are defined analogously to SPTGs.
Positional strategies. Let Plays(i) be the set of finite plays ending at a state controlled by Player i. Note
that ρ ∈ Plays(i) specifies the current state and time, as well as the history leading to this configuration. A
(positional) strategy for Player i is again defined as a map πi : Si×[0,M ]→ A∪{λ} from configurations of the
game to choices of actions. Again, for every k ∈ Si and x ∈ [0, 1), if πi(k, x) = λ then we require that there
exists a δ > 0 such that for all 0 ≤ ǫ < δ, πi(k, x+ǫ) = λ. Let δπi(k, x) = inf{x
′−x | x ≤ x′ ≤ 1, πi(k, x′) 6= λ}
be the delay before the pebble is moved when starting in state k at time x for some strategy πi. Previous
works have defined such strategies in other ways, see Remark 3.1.
History-dependent strategies. A history-dependent strategy for Player i is a map τi : Plays(i)→ (A,R≥0)
that maps every play ρ ending in a state k ∈ Si to an action j ∈ Ak and a delay t. We will only use
history-dependent strategies in the proof of one lemma (Lemma 4.2). Note that history-dependent strategies
generalize positional strategies. We denote the set of history-dependent strategies for Player i by Ti(G),
where G is omitted if it is clear from the context. Similarly, the set of positional strategies for Player i is
denoted by Πi(G).
Values. Let ρτ1,τ2k,x be the play generated when, starting from (k, x), the players play according to τ1 and
τ2. The corresponding value function is again defined as:
vτ1,τ2k (x) = cost(ρ
τ1,τ2
k,x ).
Best response, lower and upper value functions are again defined as:
vτ1k (x) = sup
τ2∈T2
vτ1,τ2k (x)
vτ2k (x) = inf
τ1∈T1
vτ1,τ2k (x)
vk(x) = sup
τ2∈T2
vτ2k (x) = sup
τ2∈T2
inf
τ1∈T1
vτ1,τ2k (x)
vk(x) = inf
τ1∈T1
vτ1k (x) = inf
τ1∈T1
sup
τ2∈T2
vτ1,τ2k (x)
Bouyer et al. [8] proved the following fundamental theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Bouyer et al. [8]) For every PTG G, there exist value functions vk(x) := vk(x) = vk(x).
Moreover, a player can get arbitrarily close to the values even when restricted to playing positional strategies:
vk(x) = sup
π2∈Π2
inf
τ1∈T1
vτ1,π2k (x) = sup
π2∈Π2
inf
π1∈Π1
vπ1,π2k (x)
vk(x) = inf
π1∈Π1
sup
τ2∈T2
vπ1,τ2k (x) = inf
π1∈Π1
sup
π2∈Π2
vπ1,π2k (x)
For the purpose of solving PTGs it, thus, suffices to consider positional strategies. In the remainder of
this section we will therefore restrict ourselves to positional strategies unless otherwise specified.
ǫ-optimal strategies. A strategy πi ∈ Πi is ǫ-optimal for Player i for ǫ ≥ 0 if:
∀k ∈ S, x ∈ [0,M ] : |vπik (x) − vk(x)| ≤ ǫ.
Since PTGs have value functions, ǫ-optimal strategies always exist for both players, for any ǫ > 0.
Non-existence of optimal strategies. Optimal strategies do not always exist, as shown by Bouyer et
al. [8]. Indeed, consider the PTG shown in Figure 7. State 1 is controlled by Player 1, the minimizer, and
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1 2 ⊥
x ∈ [0, 1]
c1 = 0
x = 0, c2 = 1
x = 1, c3 = 0
r1 = 1 r2 = 0
v1(x) = 0
v2(x) =
{
1 if x = 0
0 otherwise
Figure 7: Example of a PTG with no optimal strategy profile.
state 2 is controlled by Player 2, the maximizer. The value functions are shown on the right. Two actions
leading to the terminal state are available from state 2 at time 0 and 1, respectively. Since the rate of state
2 is 0, Player 2 picks the more expensive action with cost c2 = 1 at time 0, and at other times Player 2 waits
until time 1 and picks the cheaper action with cost c3 = 0. From state 1 exactly one action is available at
all times, and since the rate is 1, Player 1 leaves the state as soon as possible, only not at time 0. Since no
strategy can implement leaving as soon as possible there is no optimal strategy for Player 1. More precisely,
for every waiting time δ chosen by Player 1 at time 0, there exists a smaller waiting time δ′ < δ that achieves
a better value.
We reduce solving any PTG to solving a number of SPTGs. The first step towards this goal is to remove
reset actions by extending the game.
Lemma 4.2 Let G be a (n,m, r, d)-PTG. Solving G can be reduced to solving r + 1 (n,m, 0, d)-PTGs.
Proof: Let π = (π1, π2) be any strategy profile, and suppose the play ρ
π
k0,x0
is using two reset actions
j, j′ ∈ R leading to the same state d(j) = d(j′) = k. Then the configuration (k, 0) appears twice in
ρπk0,x0 , and since strategies are history-independent it appears an infinite number of times. It follows that
vπk0(x0) = ∞. By the pigeonhole principle we get that if a play ρ
π
k0,x0
uses r + 1 reset actions, then some
state is visited twice by some reset actions, and therefore vπk0(x0) =∞.
Thus, when playing G we may augment configurations by the number of times a reset action has been
used, and once this number reaches r+1 we may assume without loss of generality that the value is infinite.
This defines a new PTG G′ with states S′ = S × {0, . . . , r} and actions A′ = A× {0, . . . , r} in the following
natural way. For j ∈ A and ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , r}, destinations and costs are defined as
d′(j, ℓ) =


(d(j), ℓ + 1) if j ∈ R and ℓ < r
⊥ if j ∈ R and ℓ = r
(d(j), ℓ) otherwise
c′(j,ℓ) =
{
∞ if j ∈ R and ℓ = r
cj otherwise
while rates, existence intervals and reset actions are the same as for the corresponding states and actions
of G. Plays and value functions of G′ will be denoted by ρ′ and v′, respectively. We will show that for all
(k, x) ∈ S × [0,M ], v′(k,0)(x) = vk(x).
Every strategy profile π′ for G′ can be interpreted as a history-dependent strategy profile for G in the
following way: For every play that can be achieved by moving according to π′ make the corresponding choice
in π′, for other plays make arbitrary choices. Also, every positional strategy profile π for G can be interpreted
as a strategy profile for G′ by using the same choices regardless of the number of encountered reset actions.
With these interpretations we see that Πi(G) ⊆ Πi(G
′) ⊆ Ti(G).
For all configurations (k, x) ∈ S × [0,M ], if ρ′π
′
(k,0),x uses at most r reset actions, then cost(ρ
′π
′
(k,0),x) =
cost(ρπ
′
k,x), since the actions encountered in the two games have the same costs. If ρ
′π
′
(k,0),x uses more than
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r reset actions, then cost(ρ′
π′
(k,0),x) = ∞ ≥ cost(ρ
π′
k,x). Hence, we always have v
′π
′
(k,0)(x) ≥ v
π′
k (x). Using
Theorem 4.1 it follows that:
v′(k,0)(x) = inf
π′
1
∈Π′
1
sup
π′
2
∈Π′
2
v′
π′1,π
′
2
(k,0) (x) ≥ inf
π′
1
∈Π′
1
sup
π′
2
∈Π′
2
v
π′1,π
′
2
k (x)
= inf
π1∈Π1
sup
π2∈Π2
vπ1,π2k (x) = vk(x)
The first inequality follows from the costs being larger in G′, and the next equality follows Theorem 4.1; the
same values can be obtained using only positional strategies in G.
Next we show that v′(k,0)(x) ≤ vk(x), implying that v
′
(k,0)(x) = vk(x). This is clearly true if vk(x) = ∞,
thus, we may assume that vk(x) < ∞. In particular, ǫ-optimal strategies do not generate plays with more
than r reset actions in neither G nor G′. We see that:
vk(x) = inf
π1∈Π1
sup
π2∈Π2
vπ1,π2k (x) = inf
π′
1
∈Π′
1
sup
π′
2
∈Π′
2
v
π′1,π
′
2
k (x)
= inf
π′
1
∈Π′
1
sup
π′
2
∈Π′
2
v′
π′1,π
′
2
(k,0) (x) = v
′
(k,0)(x)
For the second equality we use Theorem 4.1; the values do not change even if certain history-dependent
strategies are available. For the third equality we use the assumption that the values are finite. This implies
that for relevant strategy profiles the values of the two games are the same.
We now know that in order to find the value vk(x) in G it suffices to find v
′
(k,0)(x) in G
′. To do this
we exploit the special structure of G′. We observe that states (k, ℓ) ∈ S × {0, . . . , r} do not depend on
states (k, ℓ′) with ℓ′ < ℓ. Thus, the game can be solved using backward induction on ℓ. In particular, when
v′(k,ℓ+1)(x) is known for all k and x, then the subgame consisting of states (k, ℓ), for k ∈ S, can be viewed
as an independent PTG with no reset actions. I.e., reset actions lead to states with known values, and can,
thus, be thought of as going directly to the terminal state with an appropriate cost. Each subgame has n
states and m actions, and there are r + 1 such subgames.

Overview over remaining lemmas. Now we just need to show how to solve PTGs without resets using
SPTGs. We will show the statement using 3 reductions. First we will reduce PTGs without resets to the
subclass of such games, where, for each action j ∈ A, we have Ij ∈ {(0, 1), [1, 1]}. Afterwards we will reduce
further to the subclass of PTGs where for each action j ∈ A, we have Ij ∈ {[0, 1], [1, 1]}. At the end we will
reduce those to SPTGs.
Let X be the set which consists of 0 and the endpoints of existence intervals of G. Let the i’th largest
element in X be Mi. Note that M1 = M .
We will now define some functions on PTGs. For a PTG G = (S1, S2, (Ak)k∈S , c, d, (rk)k∈S , (Ij)j∈A, R),
where R = ∅, a x ∈ R and a vector v ∈ (R≥0∪{∞})
n, let the priced game Gv,x = (S1, S2, (A
′
k)k∈S , c
′, d′) be
defined by:
∀k ∈ S :A′k = {j ∈ Ak | x ∈ Ij} ∪ {⊥k}
∀j ∈ A′k : c
′
j =
{
vk if j =⊥k
cj otherwise
∀j ∈ A′k : d
′
j =
{
⊥ if j =⊥k
dj otherwise
The game Gv,x is similar to the priced game defined in Definition 3.4. The intuition is that Gv,x can
model a specific moment in time.
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Function SolvePTG(G)
v(M1)← ExtendedDijkstra((S1, S2, ({j ∈ Ak |M1 ∈ Ij})k∈S , c, d));
i← 1;
while Mi > 0 do
i← i+ 1;
x← Mi−1+Mi2 ;
v′ ← ExtendedDijkstra(Gv(Mi−1),x);
v∗(x)← SolveSPTG(Gv
′,x,Mi−1−Mi);
forall x ∈ (Mi,Mi−1) do
v(x)← v∗( x−Mi
Mi−1−Mi
);
v(Mi)← ExtendedDijkstra(Gv
∗(0),Mi);
return v;
Figure 8: Algorithm for solving PTGs without reset actions.
Definition 4.3 For a given PTG G = (S1, S2, (Ak)k∈S , c, d, (rk)k∈S , (Ij)j∈A, R), a x ∈ R and a vector
v ∈ (R≥0∪{∞})
n, let the SPTG Gv,x,d = (S1, S
′
2, (A
′
k)k∈(S1∪S′2), c
′, d′, (r′k)k∈(S1∪S′2)) be defined by:
S′2 = S2 ∪ {max}
∀k ∈ S : A′k = {j ∈ Ak | x ∈ Ij} ∪ {⊥k}
Amax = {⊥max}
∀j ∈ A′k : c
′
j =


0 if k = max
vk if k 6= max and j =⊥k
cj otherwise
∀j ∈ A′k : d
′
j =


max if k ∈ S1 and either j =⊥k
or dj =⊥
⊥ if k ∈ S2 and either j =⊥k
or dj =⊥
⊥ if k = max
dj otherwise
∀k ∈ S : r′k = rk · d
r′max = max
k∈S
{rk}
The game Gv,x,d is constructed from the proof of Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7. The intuition
is that the game can model an arbitrary length interval, in the original game, where no action changes status
between available and unavailable.
Theorem 4.4 The algorithm in Figure 8 correctly solves Priced Timed Games without reset actions.
The proof of correctness is that the algorithm is a formalization of the reductions in Lemma 4.5, Lemma
4.6 and Lemma 4.7. Note that instead of Mi+Mi−12 , any arbitrary point inside (Mi,Mi−1) would work.
Let PTGn,mI be the subclass of PTGs, consisting of n states, m actions, none of which are reset actions,
and where the existence interval for each action, j, is either Ij = I or Ij = [1, 1]. In the latter case dj =⊥.
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Note that for such games we can WLOG assume that m ≤ 2n2, because for all actions with the same
existence interval, only the one with the best cost will be used.
The following lemma is using techniques similar to those of the region abstraction algorithm of Laroussinie,
Markey, and Schnoebelen [14]. The lemma is presented here mainly to be more explicit about the class of
games reduced to.
Lemma 4.5 Any game G in (n,m, 0, d)-PTG can be solved in time O((n log n + min(m,n2))d) using at
most d calls to an oracle, R, that solves PTGn,m+n(0,1) .
We sketch the proof. It is easy to find the value of k ∈ S at time M1 in a priced timed game without
reset actions, because no player can wait and hence the game is equivalent to a priced game. Between time
M2 and M1 the game is nearly an SPTG, since we can simply translate by decreasing all times with M2 and
divide the times by M1 −M2 to get a game between 0 and 1 instead. After finding the value between M2
and M1 we can then find the value at M2, since we know the cost if we wait (it becomes limx→M+
2
v(k, x)),
by viewing the game as a priced game at that point. We can then find the value between M3 and M2, then
at time M3 and so on, until we have solved the game.
Proof: We can find v(k,M1) as the value of state k in the priced game which consists of the same states
as G and the actions available at time M1. We can do so, because the game contains no reset actions and
we can therefore neither increase nor decrease time. Note that if multiple actions, j, in Ak and dj = ℓ exists
for k, ℓ ∈ S, we can ignore all but the one with the best cost for the controller of k. Hence we can solve such
a priced game in time O(n log n+min(m,n2)).
We now want to find ∀k ∈ S, x ∈ (M2,M1) : v(k, x). We see that if we wait until M1 in some state, k,
the rest of the path to ⊥ costs v(k,M1), if we play optimally from M1. We see that if we start at a time
x, we can not reach a time before x, because there are no reset actions. Hence, look at a modified game
G′, with value function v′: G′ consists of the same set of states as G, but it only has the actions available
in the interval (M2,M1), which, in G
′, only exists in that interval, and for each state, k, an action to ⊥ of
cost v(k,M1) which is only available at time M1. We will also modify G
′ such that we subtract M2 from
all points in time. Clearly that will not matter for plays starting after time M2. Note that all intervals for
actions are either (0,M1−M2) or [M1−M2,M1−M2]. We can also divide all points in time with M1−M2,
by also multiplying the rate of each state with M1 −M2. Hence all existence intervals either have the form
(0, 1) or [1, 1] and we clearly have that
∀x ∈ (M2,M1), k ∈ S : v(k, x) = v
′
(
k,
x−M2
M1 −M2
)
.
We can solve G′ using a call to R.
We will now find v(k,M2). If it is optimal to wait at time M2 in state k, we have that v(k,M2) =
limx→0+ v
′(k, x) = v′(k, 0), because we might as well wait as little as possible and then play optimally from
there. Hence, v(k,M2) is the value of state k in the priced game G
′′, consisting of the same states as G
and the same actions as those available at time M2 in G and for each state k, a action from k to ⊥ of cost
v′(k, 0). Like we did for M1 we can ignore all but one action from a state to another. Hence we can solve
such a priced game in time O(n log n+min(m,n2)).
We now want to find ∀k ∈ S, x ∈ (M3,M2) : v(k, x). We can therefore do like we did for ∀k ∈ S, x ∈
(M2,M1) : v(k, x). Also to find v(k,M3) we can do like we did for v(k, d2). We keep on doing this until we
are done.
Hence, we use d calls to R and solve d+ 1 priced games. 
We will now to reduce a game in PTGn,m(0,1), with value function, v, to a game in PTG
n,m
[0,1] using O(n logn+
min(m,n2)) time. First note that it is easy to find v(k, 1) using a priced game, because time can not change
at time 1. It is clear that v(k, 0) = limx→0+ v(k, x), because the only option at time 0 is to wait. Hence we
only need to look at finding v(k, x) for x ∈ (0, 1). To that we will use the following lemma. Note that the
game G′ mentioned in the lemma is in PTGn,m[0,1].
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Lemma 4.6 Let G be a PTGn,m(0,1), with value function v. Let G
′ be the modified version of G, where all
existence intervals of the form (0, 1) in G instead have the form [0, 1]. Let v′ be the value function for G′.
We then have: ∀k ∈ S, x ∈ (0, 1) : v(k, x) = v′(k, x).
Intuititively, the proof is as follows: First notice that the extension downward of the existence interval
does not change anything, since we can not get to a earlier point in time, than we already are at. The upward
extension is somewhat more complicated, but for any ǫ > 0 a ǫ2 -optimal strategy in G can be modified in a
slim interval close to 1 to yield a strategy which is ǫ-optimal strategy in G′. We can then from that make
an argument that the values are within ǫ of each other.
Proof: Let ǫ > 0. We will show that ∀k ∈ S, x ∈ (0, 1) : v(k, x) = v′(k, x) by constructing a strategy, σ1,
for player 1 that guarantees at most v′(k, x) + ǫ, in G, for any k ∈ S and for any x ∈ (0, 1). Similarly we
will construct a strategy, σ2, for player 2 that guarantees at least v
′(k, x) − ǫ, in G, for any k ∈ S and for
any x ∈ [0, 1).
Let σ′1 be a ǫ/2-optimal strategy for player 1 in G
′. Let rmax = maxk∈S r(s). Let σ
G
1 be the optimal
strategy in the priced game which consists of the same states as G, but only those actions available at time
1. Let σG
′
1 be the optimal strategy in the priced game which consists of the same states as G
′. It is clear
that if the existence interval of σG
′
1 (k) in G is [1, 1] then σ
G′
1 (k) = σ
G
1 (k).
We will now construct σ1.
σ1(k, x) =


λ if x = 0
σ′1(k, x) if 0 < x < 1−
ǫ
2rmax
σG
′′
1 (k) if 1−
ǫ
2rmax
≤ x < 1 and the existence
interval for σG
′
1 (k) in G is (0, 1)
λ if 1− ǫ2rmax ≤ x < 1 and the existence
interval for σG
′
1 (k) in G is [1, 1]
σG1 (k) if x = 1
Let k ∈ S, x ∈ (0, 1). We will first show that v′(k, x) ≥ v′(k, 1). If k ∈ S2 player 2 could simply wait
until time 1, and since r(k) ≥ 0 the statement follows. If k ∈ S1 player 1 must keep the play away from
S2 (because that would reduce it to the first case) and have no advantages in waiting, since no new actions
become available. But since all actions are available at time 1, player 1 could follow the same strategy, as
he uses at time x, and get the same cost.
We will now show that σ1 guarantees at most v
′(k, x) + ǫ, for k ∈ S, x ∈ (0, 1) in G. We will do
so by contradiction. Assume not. Hence there is a strategy σ2, a x ∈ (0, 1) and a k ∈ S, such that
v
(σ1,σ2)
k (x) > v
′(k, x) + ǫ. Let ρ be the play defined by (σ1, σ2).
There are now two cases. Either x ≥ 1− ǫ2rmax or not.
If x ≥ 1− ǫ2rmax , we know that
v
(σ1,σ2)
k (x) = cost(ρ) =
t−1∑
i=0
(δirkl + cjl)
We have that
∑t−1
i=0 δi is at most 1− x, because there are no reset actions, rkl ≤ rmax, by definition, and∑t−1
i=0 cjl ≤ v
′(k, 1), by construction of σ1.
Hence
v
(σ1,σ2)
k (x) ≤ (1− (1−
ǫ
2rmax
))rmax + v
′(k, 1)
= ǫ/2 + v′(k, 1) ≤ ǫ/2 + v′(k, x)
That is a contradiction.
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Otherwise, if x < 1− ǫ2rmax , there are two cases. Either the play defined by (σ1, σ2) at some point waits
until time x′ ≥ 1− ǫ2rmax or not. If not, then the play cost at least v
′(k, x) + ǫ/2 because player 1 has at all
times followed a strategy that guarantees at least that.
Otherwise, we can divide ρ up in two. ρ1 is the first part. The second part, ρ2 begins in some state k′
and at time x′ such that x′ = 1 − ǫ2rmax . Note that this might be in the middle of a wait period. Clearly
cost(ρ) = cost(ρ1) + cost(ρ2). We must have that cost(ρ1) + v′(k′, x′) ≤ v′(k, x) + ǫ/2, because we followed
a ǫ optimal strategy for player 1 in G′ in ρ1. By the first part we also know that cost(ρ2) ≤ v′(k′, x′) + ǫ/2.
Hence it is easy to see that cost(ρ) ≤ v′(k, x) + ǫ. That is a contraction.
The construction of σ2 can be done symmetrically.

We are now ready for our reduction to SPTGs.
Lemma 4.7 Solving any game G in G′ ∈ PTGn,m[0,1] can be polynomially reduced to solving an SPTG with
n+ 1 states and m+ 1 actions.
Proof: Player 2 will never use a action, j, to ⊥ except at time 1 in a simple priced timed game, because
player 2 might as well wait until time 1 before using j, which will not decrease the cost because rates are
non-negative. Hence we can change all actions, j, where the existence interval is of the form [1, 1] to [0, 1] if
j ∈ Ak, k ∈ S2 (remember that if j has an existence interval of the form [1 : 1], then dj =⊥, by definition of
PTGn,m[0,1]), without changing the value functions. We will create a new state, max, with the maximum rate
in the game, belonging to player 2, which has a action to ⊥ of cost 0 and existence interval [0, 1]. We will
now redirect all remaining actions (thus going from a state in S1) which have existence interval [1, 1] to max
(from ⊥) and change the existence interval to [0, 1]. We can see that player 1 will only use the actions to
max at time 1, since it is cheaper to wait to time 1 and then move to max.
Now all existence intervals have the form [0, 1]. It is easy to see that we only need one action, j, for
j ∈ Ak and dj = ℓ for any pair k, ℓ ∈ S, because the controller of k will, when playing optimally, only use
the action with the best, for that player, cost. Hence we get an equvivalent simple priced timed game.

Lemma 4.8 Any game G in (n,m, r, d)-PTG, can be solved in time O((r+1)d(n logn+min(m,n2))) using
at most (r + 1)d calls to an oracle R that solves SPTGs with n+ 1 states and at most m+ n+ 1 actions.
Proof: The proof is a simple consequence of Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7. 
Note that d is bounded by 2m+ 1 and r is bounded by n.
Theorem 4.9 Any game G in (n,m, r, d)-PTG, can be solved in time
O((r + 1)d(min(m,n2) + n ·min{12n,
∏
k∈S
(|Ak|+ 1)})).
Proof: The proof is a consequence of Theorem 3.12 and Lemma 4.8. Note that we only get
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+1)
and not
∏
k∈S(|Ak|+ 2), because the additional actions we add to each state (using Definition 4.3 and 3.4)
both goes to ⊥ and hence we only need one of them. 
Theorem 4.10 The number of iterations used by the BCFL-ABM algorithm to solve any PTG G is at most
m · nO(1)min{12n,
∏
k∈S
(|Ak|+ 1)} .
Proof: Note that Lemma 4.9 gives us a upper bound on the number of line segments of the value functions
of G, because the number of line segments is a lower bound of the size of the output. By Bouyer et al. [8],
page 11, we know that the number of iterations needed for the BCFL-ABM algorithm is at most the number
of line segments times n. 
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Theorem 4.11 Any priced timed game, G, in (n,m, r, d)-PTG, where all states have rate 1 and all actions
have cost 0, can be solved in time O((r + 1)d(n logn+min(m,n2))).
Proof: If we use Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.5, Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 on such a game, we get (r + 1)d
SPTGs. If we look carefully at the lemmas we see that all states, in the SPTGs have rate c, for some c > 0.
c depends on the interval length. Also, all actions that do not go to ⊥ or max have cost 0.
We now need to bound the number of event points. We will show that L(G′) = 1 for G′ being any of the
SPTGs generated.
Look at the priced game G1, as defined in section 3.1. Let σ be some optimal strategy profile for G1. We
see that, if r(k, σ) = 0 for some k ∈ S, we can not have passed through any states in S2, since it is optimal
to wait until time 1 for player 2. Since all actions of positive cost either goes to a state in S2 or from a state
in S2, we must have that v
σ
k = 0.
For convenience we repeat the definition of the next event point and the function f here. The definition
of the next event point, NextEventPoint(Gx), was:
max {0} ∪ {x′ ∈ [0, x) | ∃k ∈ S, j ∈ Ak : fj,x(x) 6= fπ(k),x(x) ∧ fj,x(x
′) = fπ(k),x(x
′)}.
The definition of f was
fj,x(x
′′) = cj + a
x(d(j)) + bx(d(j))(x − x′′).
Note that bx(d(j)) corresponds to the rate of the next state we wait in if both players follow σ and
fj,x(x
′′) is the cost to reach ⊥ if both players follow σ. Hence fj,x ≥ 0 and if b
1 = 0 then fj,x(x
′′) = 0 by the
preceding, because σ was optimal. Note that if fj,1(1) 6= fπ(k),1(1), then at least the larger expression of the
two must have b1(d(j)) = c and therefore we have that for all x ∈ [0, 1) : fj,1(x) 6= fπ(k),1(x), because either
the b1(d(j))’s are equal in the two expressions, in which case the difference between the two expressions do
not change with x, or one is positive and the other is 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1].
Therefore we can apply Theorem 3.12 and get that SolveSPTG solves any of (r + 1)d SPTGs in time
O(m+n logn). We therefore solve all in time O((r+1)d(min(m,n2)+n logn). The reductions also required
time O((r+1)(n logn+min(m,n2))d). Hence, our time bound becomes O((r+1)d(n logn+min(m,n2))) .

Theorem 4.12 Any priced timed automata (i.e., all states are controlled by Player 1), G in (n,m, r, d)-
PTG, can be solved in time O((r + 1)dn2(min(m,n2) + n logn)).
Proof: If we use Lemma 4.2, Lemma 4.5 and Lemma 4.6 on a priced timed automata, we get (r + 1)d
priced timed games, without resets where all existence intervals are either [0, 1] or [1, 1] and all states belong
to Player 1. The algorithm described in Figure 5, solves SPTGs by first solving them for time 1, as a priced
game, and then solve them by induction backwards through time. We can still solve the game at time 1,
and there is no differences in the induction, since no actions become available at time x for x < 1. Hence,
from Theorem 3.11 and Theorem 3.12 we get that we can solve such games in time n2(min(m,n2)+n logn).
The reductions also required time O((r+1)d(min(m,n2) +n logn)) and therefore the total time complexity
is O((r + 1)dn2(min(m,n2) + n logn)). 
5 Concluding remarks
We have presented an algorithm for solving one clock priced timed games with a complexity which is close
to linear in L, with L = L(G) being a lower bound on the size of the object to be produced as output. We
think it is an attractive candidate for implementation.
We have also given a new upper bound on L. While it is better than previous bounds, we do not expect
this bound to be optimal. It seems to be a “folklore theorem” that L does not become very big for games
arising in practice. We would like to suggest the following conjecture.
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Conjecture 5.1 For all SPTGs G, L(G) ≤ p(n) for some polynomial p.
Note that if this conjecture is established, it implies that our algorithm as well as the BCFL-ABM algorithm
runs in time polynomial in the size of its input.
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